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A. Introduction 
As charismatic leaders, the role of religious leaders (kyai, ‘ulama, and 
muballigh) in Muslim community is central. Their charisma stems from their deep 
knowledge of religion and good conduct. Consequently, they are the persons whom the 
people obey, listen to their advice, and imitate their conduct. Although their expertise is 
religion, their role in community expands beyond this expertise. People usually come to 
them for a number of purposes, ranging from family matters to social ones, from 
business affairs to politics. The government also benefits from them by asking their 
support for the government’s program. Their support takes several forms, such as 
issuing the fatwa and direct involvement in the program. On the other hand, the kyais 
and ‘ulama also benefit from the government. They receive large amount of money 
from the government to support their activities, such as the development of their 
madrasahs and pesantrens. 
Since the last decade of the twentieth century, Indonesia has witnessed the 
emergence of Salafi movement. Supported by the same global movement, this 
movement has produced Salafi leaders, well-known as ustāḍs. They graduated from the 
Salafi education institutions in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Some of them are alumni of 
the Saudi-sponsored higher education, LIPIA (Institute of Islamic and Arabic Studies) 
in Jakarta. In addition to their activities in teaching the students in their pesantrens, 
these ustāds actively hold religious teaching in public mosques, offices, or private 
houses. Their religious gatherings have attracted the following, and thus they become 
new religious leaders, religious elite, who challenge the existing religious authorities: 
kyais, ‘ulama, and religious leaders of mass organizations. The challenge of this group 
has been consciously sensed by the leaders of mass Muslim organizations, because of 
the conversion of some of their activists. Community responses to Salafi movement 
differ, ranging from verbal to violent action. This article discusses how this new 
religious elite emerges and challenges the existing religious leaders.  
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B. Religious Authority: Kyai, Ulama and ustadz 
Kyai, ‘ulama and ustād are religious elites who hold religious authority. 
Religious authority means “the right to impose rules which are deemed to be in 
consonance with the will of God.” In Weberian context, it can be defined as “the right to 
impose obedience in the name of common values and rules of conduct, share by those 
who exercise this authority and those who are submitted to it”.50 Muslim community 
called this group differently. The Sundanese of West Java calls kyai as Ajengan, while 
the Acehnese calls this scholar as Teungku. 51  They are the specialists in religious 
sciences, and capable of giving guidance and advice to the people on religious matters 
and good conducts in line with religious injunctions. The term kyai is a title given by 
community to the scholars of Islam, who usually lead the pesantren.52  
Slightly different from kyai, ‘ulamā is a title given to scholars of Islam who do 
not lead pesantren. Literally, the term ‘ulama connotes the people with broad 
knowledge. The knowledge in this regard is universal, covering both secular and 
religious knowledge. However, this broad sense narrows to limited people, to those who 
possess good command of Islamic knowledge, particularly fiqh (Islamic law) and 
hadith.53 Thus, the term ‘ulama denotes a wider coverage than the term kyai. However, 
these terms are used interchangeably. These titles, kyai, ‘ulama, and ustad, are given by 
the community. They are given after deliberate consideration based not only on deep 
knowledge, but also on ethics and good conduct.54 
Scholars hold different opinions concerning the position between kyai and 
‘ulama; who is superior between the two. Hiroko Horikoshi maintains that kyai is higher 
than ‘ulama. He argues that a kyai is more capable than ‘ulama in exercising ijtihad 
(free reasoning), while the ‘ulama does not. For him, ‘ulama holds taqlīd (blind 
imitation) to the opinions of earlier ‘ulama. Kyai is also perceived more charismatic 
than the ‘ulama in the eyes of community.  ‘Ulama represents himself as a religious 
official (religious functionaries). ‘Ulama holds this function in religious institutions, 
such as madrasa and pesantren.55 The different titles of kyai and ‘ulama lie in the social 
status and influence of these two figures in community. On the contrary, van Bruinessen 
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views that the position of ‘ulama is higher than that of kyai. This evaluation is based on 
a kyai’s acknowledgment whom he interviewed. Although van Bruinessen regarded him 
an ‘ulama, the kyai felt that he had not reached the level of ‘ulama; he was still in the 
level of kyai.56 
In practice, the title kyai is also given to the chairperson of mass Muslim 
organizations, such as the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. In the NU 
community, some leading figures such as Muchith Muzadi, are called kyai although 
they do not head the pesantren. A similar tradition occurs in Muhammadiyah. Since its 
foundation in 1912, the chairpersons of Muhammadiyah were called kyai. To give 
example, Abdul Razak Fachruddin (chairman of Muhammadiyah from 1971 to 1985), 
and his successor, Azhar Basyir (chairman of Muhammadiyah  from 1995 to 1998) are 
called kyai even though they did not lead the pesantren. This title, however, ended with 
Azhar Basyir. After Basyir, Muhammadiyah was led by Muslim intellectuals: Amien 
Rais (from 1995 to 1998), Syafi’i Maarif (from 1998 to 2005), and Sirojuddin 
Syamsuddin (from 2005 to date). Rather than a representation of traditional kyais, these 
leaders are Muslim scholars who graduated from American universities in social 
sciences; Rais graduated in political sciences of the University of Chicago, Maarif 
graduated in history of Political Islam of the University of Chicago, while Syamsudin 
graduated in political Islam of University of California at Los Angeles.57 They indeed 
hold good understanding of religion, because they went to Islamic education institution 
before their study abroad. Din Syamsuddin, for example, went to famous modern 
pesantren, Darussalam, Gontor, East Java. Moreover, he graduated in comparative study 
of religions, at the State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN, now UIN) Jakarta. Thus, 
since the last decade, Muhammadiyah has been led by Muslim intellectuals, or ‘ulama 
in a broader sense.  
Besides kyai and ‘ulama, the term ustād and muballigh are commonplace to call 
a man of religion. The term ustād connotes the teacher of religious knowledge. The 
teachers of pesantren, regardless their subjects taught, are called ustād by santris and 
community nearby. In practice, a person who frequently delivers religious lesson in 
mosques is also called ustād. The community often called this type of religious man as 
muballigh (preacher). In addition to religious lessons taking place in mosques, offices, 
and houses, ustāds and muballigh often deliver Friday sermons. In many cases, ustāds 
and muballighs get salaries from this activity, and even some professional ustads and 
muballighs earn money from this activity. Concerning these titles, it is worth to mention 
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syamsuddin.html, accessed on January 2, 2012.  
  1056 
here that, unlike the heads of traditional pesantren of the NU who are called kyai, 
leaders of Muhammadiyah pesantren are simply called ustād. The same call is found in 
another reformist organization, the Persatuan Islam (Persis). The leaders of this puritan 
group are called ustād, and leaders of Persis’ pesantren are simply called ustād. 
Kyai’s role in community is so central. People come to this group of religious 
elite for different purposes: asking a religious guidance, and acquiring solution of 
family problems, economic consultation and even political support. In many occasions, 
some people consult kyai and ask his advice before commencing their business, and 
marriage. Geertz mentions the role of kyai in community a cultural broker. He argues 
that as a person with deep knowledge of religion, kyai is to transform the universal 
doctrines and values of religion as prescribed in the Qur’an, hadith, and books of the 
Islamic law in different maḍhabs (schools of Islamic law), and adjust them into local 
practices. In this regard, the kyai interprets the abstract, universal and systematic 
doctrines of Islam in the context of local beliefs and traditions. It is the kyia, Geertz 
claims, who determines whether or not local practices are Islamic.58 Many ordinary 
Muslims even believe that kyai has supra-natural power that enables him see evil spirits 
and forecast future fortune. In congruent with animistic belief of the villagers, some 
kyai acted as dukun curing some diseases. Observing this phenomenon, Geertz 
concludes that “the kijaji [kyai] thus brings together the general moral doctrines of 
Islam and the specific animistic notions of local tradition, the fragmented, barely 
conceptualized, practical religion of the ordinary peasant...”59 A similar assessment is 
given by Horikoshi. Based on his research on the role of kyai in Garut, West Java, he 
observes that kyai plays a significant role in preserving the traditional practices, filtering 
negative values of modernizations, and becoming the agent of change, such as providing 
the community with educational and economic opportunities.60 In short, kyai plays as a 
key agent of change, of modernization, who actively introduces the modern values to 
the villagers.61 
Along with the changes of social and political conditions of post-Independence 
Indonesia, the mediatory role of kyai shifts from bridging between what is called a 
“Meccan” universal notions of Islam and “Javanese” beliefs and practices to link 
between Jakarta and the village. This transformation occurred when the idea of state 
nation emerged and needed to be communicated and understood by the villagers. As a 
modern nation needs political engagement of all citizens via, among others, their 
participation in political parties, many kyais are involved in supporting the traditionalist 
Islamic party, the Nahdlatul Ulama. Through this party, as the ‘owners” of the ummat in 
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59 Clifford Geertz, “The Javanese Kijaji”, pp. 238-239. 
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the level of grassroots, kyais are active in mobilizing the umma via public gatherings. In 
these occasions, in addition to giving religious guidance, kyais tried to translate modern 
ideas of development into religious terminologies, and talk to the umma in local 
languages. Thus, Geertz concludes that as a cultural broker, kyai has shifted from a 
broker for Islamic civilization to a broker for national government.62  
Regarding these titles, Salafi teachers are not called kyais, but ustād. The leaders 
of Salafi pesantrens are simply called ustād or mudīr al-ma’had (director of pesantren), 
to denote the position of the teacher. This title reflects equality among Salafis. It is 
common to find that santris of Salafi pesantrens talked with the mudīr freely without 
nervousness. During my fieldwork in pesantren Assunnah in Cirebon, for example, I 
frequently witnessed Thaharah, the then mudīr, sitting in mosque’s corridor talking with 
santris. Similarly, this scene occurs in the Salafi religious gatherings: some followers 
move closer to Salafi teachers after religious gatherings in mosques. They ask the 
teachers about religious matters which have not been answered during the session. This 
condition, equality, seems to be attractive of a new adherent or sympathizer of Salafi 
movement. A managerial staff at the STAI Ali ibn Abi Thalib in Surabaya, East Java, 
for example, told that one of his interests in joining Salafism is equality showed by 
Salafi teachers. He compared between kyais of traditional pesantrens of the Nahdlatul 
Ulama and the mudīrs of Salafi pesantrens. While the santris of Salafi pesantren can 
approach the mudīr easily, the santris of the traditional pesantrens respect their kyais 
excessively, such as kissing hand (taqbīl), preparing sandal when the kyai wants to go 
out from mosque, and massaging the kyai before teaching. In addition to honor, these 
attitudes aim at acquiring the berkah (Ar., baraka means God’s blessing) from the kyai. 
The students believe that by respecting and serving the kyai, they will receive God’s 
blessing through the kyai. 
The santris’ attitudes towards their kyai are rooted in traditional doctrine of the 
student’s behavior towards the teacher, the Ta’lim al-Muta’allim Tariq al-Ta’allum 63of 
Burhan al-Islam al-Zarnuji. This work deals with a number of instructions and methods 
of learning. The work is divided into 13 chapters, including the nature and merit of 
knowledge, the intention of study, the choice of subject matters of knowledge, teachers, 
colleague, and permanent association; and respecting the knowledge and those who 
possesses it. Of most important subject of this work is pupil’s attitude towards his 
teacher. According to the work, a student should respect fully his teacher. A student is 
not allowed to walk in front the teacher; not to seat on teacher’s chair; not to begin 
talking with the teacher without his permission; not to talk much with the teacher 
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without his consent.64 In addition, the students have to respect the teacher’s relative and 
colleagues. For example, the students have to stand when a son of teacher comes to 
show their respect to the teacher.65  Based on these teachings, students of traditional 
pesantrens respect fully their teachers. They believe that respecting the kyai and 
teachers will result in God’s blessing.  
Sociologically there exists stratification among Salafi ustā s. Thus, here we can 
identify some prominent ustāḍs among Salafi groups, whom we can classify them into 
senior ustāds. Within the so-called “Yemeni” Salafis in Indonesia, we can mention 
Muhammad as-Sewed and Luqman Ba’abduh as senior ustāds. The two figures are 
regarded as their leaders replacing Ja’far Umar Thalib. As-Sewed currently heads two 
pesantrens, Dhiyā’ al-Sunnah in Cirebon, West Java, and al-Anshar in Sleman, 
Yogyakarta. Meanwhile, Ba’abduh is currently the director of pesantren Salafiya in 
Jember, East Java. Before directing this pesantren, he studied with shaykh Muqbil al-
Wadi’i in his institution, Darul Hadith, Dammaj, Yemen. There are indeed some other 
Salafi teachers in the second level, such as Afifuddin of Sidayu, Gresik, and Abdul 
Mu’thi of Yogyakarta. In the other group, the so-called haraki Salafis, more prominent 
figures are found. Included in these leading ustā s are Abdul Qadir Jawwas of Bogor, 
West Java, Abdul Hakim Abdat of Jakarta, Abu Nida of Yogyakarta, Abdurrahman al-
Tamimi of Surabaya, and Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin of Solo. Both Jawwas and Abdul 
Hakim studied Salafism at the Institute of Arabic and Islamic Studies (LIPIA), Jakarta, 
and currently teach at pesantren Minhaj al-Sunnah in Bogor, West Java. Meanwhile, 
Abu Nida and Asifuddin graduated in Jami’a Imam Muhammad ibn Su’ud, Riyadh. 
Asifuddin currently heads large Salafi pesantren Imam Bukhari in Solo, while Abu Nida 
heads the Bin Baz Islamic center in Yogyakarta. In the lower level, some figures 
emerge, including Abu Qatadah of Tasikmalaya, Abu Haidar of Bandung, Mubarak 
Bamualim of Surabaya. 
 
C. Salafi Ustāds: Challenging Religious Authority 
The emergence of Salafi teachers challenges the existing of religious authorities. 
Salafis challenge both traditional and reformist religious leaders: kyai, ulama and 
muballighs. The emergence of Salafism has caused opposition from villagers and local 
religious leaders as well. To show this challenge, in this part I will describe the 
mubāḥatha (discussion, dialog) between Salafis and leaders of Persatuan Islam (Persis). 
In this dialog forum, each party poses and examines its religious arguments before 
public.  
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The case of mubāḥatha shows how Salafis challenging religious authorities of 
Persatuan Islam (Persis), a purist and reformist organization. The mubā atha entitled 
“Mengungkap Gerakan Salafy di Indonesia [Discovering Salafi Movement in 
Indonesia]” was conducted on 27 March 2007 in Bandung, West Java. The initiative of 
this dialog emerged from the head of Persis, West Java region. It was attended by 
prominent figures of Persis, including Siddiq Amien (chairman), Aceng Zakaria (the 
then head of Pesantren Persis in Garut, West Java), Usman Sholehuddin, head of Dewan 
Hisbah Persis, and Maman Abdurrahman. In addition to these leading figures of persis, 
the forum was also attended by delegations of Persis of all districts in West Java. The 
other party, the Salafis, is represented by Abdul Hakim Abdat (Jakarta) and Abu 
Qatadah (director of pesantren Ihyaus Sunnah, Tasikmalaya, West Java). Other Salafi 
figures, such as Tonari (Cirebon), Yunus Anis and Ayip Saefuddin were also present. 
During the discussion and dialog, Salafis and Persis discussed arguments and examined 
the dalīl of the necessity of following the Salaf manhaj. 
The discussion was started by a welcoming speech of committee, and a brief 
speech of the head of Persis, West Java region. Following these speeches, Siddiq 
Amien, as a keynote speaker, presented his article on “Fenomena Gerakan Dakwah 
Salafy di Indonesia dan Menimbang Argumentasi Manhaj al-Salaf al-Saleh sebagai 
Dasar Ketiga sesudah al-Qur’an dan al-Sunnah” [Phenomenon of Salafi Da’wa 
Movement in Indonesia and Examination of arguments of Salaf Manhaj as the Third 
Source after the Qur’an and Sunna]. In his presentation, Amien highlighted some 
essential aspects Salafi movement in the country. In the first part of his presentation, he 
discussed the definition of Salafism. On this issue, he elaborated the meaning of “Salaf” 
and its derivatives. He explained that “Salaf” literally means “the predecessor”, and the 
“Salaf al-Salih” denotes the first three generations of Muslims, consisting of the 
Companions, the Followers, and the Followers of Followers. Meanwhile, Salafi 
connotes a person who follows the path of Salaf. In this point, Amien, as a 
representative of Persis, did not differ from the Salafis in defining Salafism. Amien then 
complemented his presentation with his observation on the rise of Salafis movements in 
Indonesia. For him, the Salafi doctrines had inspired some religious movements in the 
country. The Wahhabi movement inspired the Paderi movement in Minangkabau, West 
Sumatera, in the 19th century. In the 20th century, Salafi ideas influenced the birth of a 
number of reformist religious movements: the Jami’at Khayr in 1905 in Jakarta, al-
Irsyad in 1913 in Jakarta, Muhammadiyah in 1912 in Yogyakarta, and Persatuan Islam 
in 1923 in Bandung. With a different emphasis, these organizations call on Muslim for 
the return the Qur’an and Sunnah; support the jihad and ijtihad; and fighting against 
bid’a, khurafat, taqlīd; through various methods of da’wa, including education, 
preaching and publications. In Amien’s observation, all these organizations are Salafis, 
because they follow the path of al-Salaf. 
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The second issued highlighted by Amien is fragmentation of current Salafi 
movement in Indonesia. Quoting the work of Abu Abdurrahman al-Thalibi, Dakwah 
Salafiyah Dakwah Bijak,66 Amien explored Salafis’ fragmentation into “Yemeni” and 
“haraki” Salafis. The first faction refers to former Laskar Jihad activists under the 
leadership of Ja’far Umar Thalib, and the followers of shaykh Muqbil al-Wadi’i of 
Yemen, and shaykh Rabi ibn Hadi al-Madkhali of Saudi, while the latter is associated 
with the Ihyā’ al-Turāth al-Islāmī and al-Munta ā al-Islāmī. While the first group of 
Salafis refutes the haraki method in da’wa, the latter maintains that the haraki method is 
needed in the application of da’wa in this modern era. Moreover, Amien mentioned 
individual conflict between Salafis. 
The last problem roused by Amien in his speech was the nature of difference 
between the Salaf, the first three generations of Muslim. Amien agreed with Salafis that, 
besides the prophet, Muslims must take into account the examples and opinions of the 
Salaf on religious matters. However, it was the fact that the Salaf differed among them 
in a number of issues. For example, the difference between Abu Bakr al-Siddiq and 
‘Umar ibn Khattab on the one hand, and ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan on the on the other hand, 
on the issue of āḍān (call for prayer) of the Friday prayer. Following the prophet, the 
first two caliphs implemented one ā ān before the prayer, while the third caliph added 
one more āḍān, and thus, there were two āḍāns during the reign of ‘Uthman. Taking 
this case as example, Amin questioned “which Salafis Muslim should follow: Abu Bakr 
and ‘Umar, or ‘Uthman”? According to Persis, the rationale of ‘Uthman was clear; as 
the Muslim’s territory expanded, Muslims became more widespread and, therefore one 
more āḍān was added to signify the coming of prayer time. Thus, following this 
example, Persis contended that the Salaf exercised a rational thinking. Taking this 
difference into account, together with the prophet’s last speech on the necessity of 
maintaining the two sources of Islam, the Qur’an and sunna, Amien concluded that 
Persis discovers no a clear sound argument of the obligation of Muslims to follow the 
Salaf’s manhaj (path) as advocated by Salafis. 
Following the keynote speech of the chairman of Persis was Salafis’ 
presentation. There were two Salafis presenting their speeches: Abdul Hakim Abdat, 
and Abu Qatadah. Abdat is a senior Salafi ustād, while Abu Qatadah is a more junior 
ustād. Both ustāds are of the leading Salafis who frequently visit a number of cities to 
preach Salafism. Abdat took the first chance. The focus of his presentation was the 
religious arguments of the obligation of Muslims to follow the Salaf manhaj in their 
religiosity (thought and conduct). Before discussing this issue, he first took this 
opportunity to refute analysis and remarks of the previous speaker, Siddiq Amien, 
dealing with the frictions among Indonesia’s Salafi, and the absence of a clear and 
sound argument of the necessity of imitating the Salaf. On the first issue, Abdat denied 
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the frictions among Indonesia’s Salafis into Yemeni and Haraki. According to him, this 
fraction is only an opinion, which is far from the reality. He claimed that Salafis are 
monolithic and do not recognize the fractions. In this regard, Abdat contended that the 
analysis must be applied to the manhaj, and not to individuals. On the second issue, 
Abdat maintained that Persis’ incapability to find a clear and sound argument of 
Muslims’ obligation to follow the Salafi manhaj does not denote the absence of the 
argument. This, according to Abdat, might be caused by the fact that Persis has not 
observed the dalīl. Therefore, Abdat took this opportunity to present a number of 
religious arguments. 
These religious arguments occupied the subsequent talk of Abdat. Abdat 
elaborated arguments of the obligation of Muslims to follow the Salafi manhaj from the 
Qur’an, and hadith. He presented five dalils from the Qur’anic verses: 9:100; 9:119; 
12:108; 2:136-137; 1:6. Because of the limit of space, I would like present the first two 
arguments only: 9:100, and 9:119. The first verse, 9:100, reads as follows:  
The vanguard (of Islam)- the first of those who forsook (their homes) and of 
those who gave them aid, and (also) those who follow them in (all) good deeds,- well- 
pleased is Allah with them, as are they with Him: for them hath He prepared Gardens 
under which rivers flow, to dwell therein for ever: that is the supreme triumph. 
As explicitly mentioned in the verse, Abdat argued, the muhājirūn (emigrants) 
and anṣār (helpers) were pleased by God. God’s please means that God loves their 
deeds and actions. According to Abdat, the verse implies an order from God for 
Muslims to follows the companions in order to acquire God’s satisfaction. This order 
emerges in the form of khabar (news), not in form of ordinary order.  
The second verse, 9:119, reads as follows:  
“O, ye who believe! Fear Allah and be with those who are truthful.”  
According Abdat, the term al-ṣādiqīn (truthful) refers to the prophet’s 
companions. Again, according to Abdat, this verse implies an order for Muslims to 
imitate the companions. In addition to Qur’anic verses, Abdat mentioned a famous 
hadith telling that best three generations of Muslims: the Companions, the followers and 
the followers of followers. Relying on these dalīls, Abdat concluded that to follow the 
Salaf manhaj is obligatory for Muslims. 
The second Salafi speaker was Abu Qatadah. Commencing this talk, he 
acknowledged humbly that he was an activist of Persis; he went to Persis pesantren for 
seven years before his conversion to Salafism. His talk focused on three issues: the 
sources of Islamic doctrines, divergent opinions of the companions, and the possibility 
of being deviant from the truth without following the Salaf manhaj. Concerning the first 
issue, the speaker, explained that the sources of Islamic doctrines were the Qur’an, 
hadith, sound ijmā’ (Consensus), and sound qiyās (analogy). On the second issue, the 
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speaker acknowledged that the Companions had differed in number of religious issues. 
Responding to these differences, Abu Qatadah maintained that Muslims can follow one 
of these opinions, but they are not allowed to add another opinion. On third issue, Abu 
Qatadah argued that Muslim may fall into a mistake if he or she follows the Qur’an and 
hadith only. To strengthen his argument, Abu Qatadah recalled the history of Islam, 
namely the case of assassination ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, the fourth caliph, by Ibn Muljam, 
an adherent of khawarij. When murdered the caliph, Ibn Muljam read the Qur’anic 
verse 5:44, which reads: “If any do fail to judge by (the light of) what Allah hath 
revealed, they are unbelievers.” Referring to this fact, Abu Qatadah posed an essential 
question: “Look at this case! How did the murder read the Qur’an when he murdered 
the caliph?” Based on the case, he argued that the Qur’an and hadith alone are 
insufficient as the sources of Islam. Muslim must follow the Salaf manhaj in 
understanding these sources. He argued that all deviating sects, such as Khawarijite, 
Mu’tazilate and Shi’ite, complemented their arguments with Qur’anic verses and 
hadiths, but they interpreted in line with their reason. 
The next session was more interesting than the previous one, since it provided 
discussion, dialog, debate between Salafis and leading figures of Persis. The main 
question of the participants was about the Salafis’ claim that the Salafi manhaj was the 
true one. Maman Abddurahman, one of chairpersons of central of board Persis, posed 
question about Salafism whether it is a method of thought or a name of group. If it is a 
method of thought, according to Abdurrahman, many Muslim thinkers, such as 
Muhammad Abduh, advocated the Salaf method. Concerning this issue, Abdurrahman 
maintained that a number of Muslim organizations, such as al-Irsyad, Muhammadiyah 
and Persis have adopted the Salaf method. In his opinion, the core spirit of the Salaf 
method is the reform movement, including purification of aqīda (Islamic faith), 
purification of ‘ibāda (rituals) and reform of mu’āmala (social interactions). Viewed 
from this perspective, Persis is also Salaf. If Salafism is a way of thought, Abdurrahman 
continued, why a group of Muslims claims to be the true Salaf. Another delegation from 
Tasikmalaya, Yuyu Wahyu, raised a quite similar question challenging the validity of 
Salafis’ arguments. In direct manner, he asked: “Who are the Salaf”? Are Muhammad 
‘Abduh and his disciple, Rashid Rida, Salaf? He challenged the Salafis’ arguments of 
the obligation of following the Salaf manhaj. According to him, the prophet advised 
Muslims to hold to the two sources only, the Qur’an and hadith. The prophet also 
believed that Muslims will not deviate from the true Islam when they follow these 
fundamental sources. In order to understand the two sources, Muslims must learn some 
methodological approaches, which in turn, will result in a number of laws. However, 
Wahyu added, Persis examines not only the products (thought and laws), but also the 
process (methods) and rationale of the products. This is in line with a maxim of Islamic 
legal theory, “the law depends on the availability of reason” (al-ḥukm yadūr ma’a al-
‘illa wujūd wa ‘adam). The third participant, Zae Nandang, asked the speakers about the 
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different opinions among the companions. When the companions differed each other on 
one matter, Nandang asked, whom Muslim must follow. 
Responding to these questions, Abdat, the first Salafi speaker, replied that what 
he delivered was the Salafi manhaj as a method of thought and a way of religious life, 
and not the matters of fiqh in which the Salaf had differed in a number of issues. Abdat 
contended that the Salaf had agreed on essential teachings of Islam. They believed in 
the God’s punishment in the graves after the death, in the God’s pre-destination, in 
God’s occupation on His Chair (‘Arsh), in God’s Face and Hand, which are different 
from those of human, and in eternality (qadīm) of the Qur’an. Abdat argued that the 
Salaf did not differ on these matters. On the need of following the Salafi manhaj, Abdat 
argued that the Qur’an and hadith are true (ḥaq). However, he continued, not all the 
people arguing with the Qur’anic verses and prophetic traditions are true. Again, he 
mentioned a number of Muslim groups, such as the Mu’tazilite, who reject some hadiths 
because they perceived that these hadiths contradict the Qur’an. According to Abdat, the 
Mu’tazila and the Muslim philosophers referred to the Qur’an and hadith to support 
their thought, but they interpreted them in line with their ratio, and as a result, they 
deviated from the true Islam. In order to avoid the same mistake, Abdat argued, 
following the Salaf manhaj is necessary in understanding the Qur’an and hadith. Thus, 
in the Salafi slogan the phrase “the return to the Qur’an and hadith” as advocated by a 
number of reformist Muslim organizations must be accomplished by “with 
understanding of the Salaf”. Meanwhile, Abu Qatadah, in his reply, highlighted the 
characteristics of the Salaf.  Referring to Yahya Abd al-Mu’in, he mentioned a number 
of beliefs of ahl al-sunna. These include the belief in the pre-destination; giving 
precedence to Abu Bakr and ‘Umar ibn Khattab in faith and caliphate; the belief in the 
punishment in the grave; and the belief in the Day of Resurrection. Moreover, he 
mentioned a number of Salafi methods in concluding the laws (istidlāl). First, the return 
to the Qur’an and hadith; second, understanding the Qur’an and hadith in line with the 
Salaf manhaj; third, preferring the texts (naṣṣ) than ratio (‘aql); fourth, returning the 
mutashābih texts (allegoric texts that have more than one and uncertain meanings) to 
the muḥkam texts (texts that have accurate and precise meanings); and the last, 
reconciling the arguments when the dalils differ. Based on this ground, Abu Qatadah 
contended that each individual, group or organization must measure itself whether or 
not he is Salafi. 
The discussion continued to the second term of question and answer session. 
There were four participants raising questions in this term. Almost all of them asked the 
validity of Salafi’s arguments of the necessity of following the Salaf manhaj. They also 
questioned the speakers whom they must follow when the Salaf differ in a number of 
issues. Uus, for example, severely criticized Salafis for their insistence in following the 
Salaf manhaj. He argued with a widely accepted hadith telling a dialog between the 
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prophet and Mu’a  ibn Jabal before the prophet sent him to Yemen. The prophet was 
reported to have asked his messenger on the sources of religious matters. Ibn Jabal 
replied that he would rely on the Book of God and the Sunna. If he could not find in 
these two fundamental sources, he would exercise ijtihad with his ratio (ajtahid bi 
ra’yī), and the prophet agreed. Relying on this story, Uus continued that the hadith does 
not tell us to follow the opinions of the companions. 
Encountering these questions, the Salafis remained in their position. Abdat, for 
example, repeatedly maintained that the dialog should be focused on the Salaf manhaj 
as a method of thought and conduct in religious matters. For him, the different opinions 
between the Salaf is not an issue, since they appeared in the particularity and disputed 
matters (juz’iyyāt and khilāfiyāt), and not in the essential doctrines of Islam, the aqīda.  
It appeared that during the mubā atha, Salafis and Persis disputed on several 
aspects. On the one hand, since the beginning Persis raised the questions of the 
differences among the companions of the prophet on a number of issues. Through these 
differences, Persis contended that Muslims should grasp the spirit and the elan vital of 
the difference, and not the texts, in order to cope with modern demands. On the other 
hand, Salafis tried to avoid discussing the differences between the Salaf, but sought 
similarities among them. Even though they differ in many issue, Salafis argued, they 
agree in essential doctrines.    
Both parties agreed that the Salafi manhaj is a method of thought in concluding 
Islamic law. Both agreed that the Salaf were the best generations of Muslim community, 
since they are considered as the people who understand the religion best after the 
prophet. However, Salafis and Persis disputed in the obligation of Muslim to follow the 
Salaf manhaj. As evident in the Salafis’ arguments, this obligation is inferred and 
indirectly ordered by the Qur’anic verses and hadith. The God’s satisfaction with the 
Salaf, for example, is understood and interpreted by Salafis as an order for Muslim to 
follow the Salaf. Similarly, the widely hadith on the best three generations of Muslim 
community is considered as an instruction of the prophet to follow the Salaf manhaj. 
This rationale is rejected by Persis. According to Persis, there is no a clear and sound 
religious argument from the Qur’an and hadith that obligates Muslims to follow the 
Salaf manhaj. Two famous hadiths are cited in this matter. First is the hadith telling the 
last advise of prophet for Muslims to hold the Book of God and Sunna; and the second 
is the hadith of Mu’ā  ibn Jabal. These hadiths do not request Muslims to follow the 
Salaf manhaj.  
In this dialog, we can see how Salafis and Persis examine their religious 
arguments, challenging each other, and contesting their religious authority. The effort to 
establish their religious authority was not only seen Salafis’ religious arguments, but 
also in their way of delivering argument. During the dialog, Abu Qatadah always read 
Arabic texts and then translating it into Bahasa Indonesia. Although his translation was 
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exactly the same as the Arabic text, he needed to expose his argument first in Arabic, 
and then followed by its translation. This method, he wanted to show that his Arabic is 
excellent and he was authoritative in religious affairs. In addition, during the dialog he 
also wore turban. For many people, turban symbolizes piety and certain degree of 
religious knowledge. Through this dialog, each party, especially Salafis, maintained 
their religious authority before their adherents. 
It is interesting to observe the shift of religious authority in Indonesia. 
Traditional religious authorities (kyai and ‘ulama) have been recently challenged by the 
newly emerging and popular muballighs (preacher), and da’i (preacher), such as Arifin 
Ilham and Abdullah Gymnastyar (well-known as ‘Aa Gym). Supported by electronic 
media, particularly the national television channel, such as TV One, Metro TV, Surya 
Citra Television (SCTV), these young figures have attracted Muslims. This 
phenomenon can be observed from the participants attending the religious lessons 
delivered by these figures. The “Majelis Zikir” of Arifin Ilham, for example, was 
attended by hundreds of Muslims. The participants, mostly women, wear the white long 
dresses and chanted zikr (special formula to remember God). What is interesting of the 
Majelis Zikir is that many participants cry during the pengajian. In addition to the zikr, 
the content of the lesson delivered by Ilham is daily duties of Islam, such as prayers.67 
Another beloved preacher by women was Abdullah Gymnastyar from Bandung, West 
Java. He manages religious programs adopting the name of Managemen Qalbu (Heart 
Management). Like Arifin, Gymnastyar’s sermons were attended by thousands of 
Muslims, mostly women. His fame significantly deteriorated after he took a second 
wife. This deterioration, according Hoesterey, due to the fact that Gymnastyar’s 
authority does not stem from his deep knowledge of Islam, but from his image of an 
ideal husband. Before his fans, Aa Gym is represented as a good husband for his wife, 
and a good father for his children. Thus, when Aa Gym took the second wife, he broke 
his image.68 
In addition to these individual and independent preachers, Muhammadiyah and 
Nahdlatul Ulama also have faced the challenges from mass organizations, namely 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Justice Prosperity Party (PKS). As a party of da’wa, 
PKS, which attracts many fresh graduates of the Middle Eastern universities, often 
produces its religious “fatwa”. In 2005, for example, PKS declared publicly that the 
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celebration of ‘Īd al-Adha one day earlier than the official day made by the 
government.69 
 
D. Concluding Remarks 
The emergence of Salafi movement raises different responses from Muslim 
community. The responses vary from verbal, physical gestures, intellectual to violence. 
The case of Mubahatsah above is a good example of intellectual response of Persatuan 
Islam. Persatuan Islam, together with Muhammadiyah, faces a serious challenge from 
Salafis. In cities, Salafism has attracted some activists of Muhammadiyah and Persis, 
and converted them to Salafi. The fascination could be caused by the fact that Salafism 
and reformist organizations share a similar slogan of purification of Islamic doctrines, 
“the return to the Qur’an and hadith”. Having this similarity, Salafi ustadhs successfully 
convince young activists of Muhammadiyah and Persis. Thus, the mubahatha case can 
be viewed as an effort of leading figure of Persis to limit the influence of Salafism to the 
adherent and sympathizers of Persis. Through dialog, Persis tries to show the weakness 
of Salafism. On the other hand, the Salafis have opportunity to examine their arguments. 
Thus, the dialog shows the contest of religious authority between the two parties.    
  
 
* The writer is a lecturer at Faculty of Ushuluddin and Philosophy, UIN Syarif 
Hidayatullah Jakarta. 
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